




   
 
























In the aftermath of WWII, many developing countries have opted for policies
aimed at promoting new infant industries or at protecting local traditional activ-
ities from competition by products from more advanced countries. Thus several
Latin American countries advocated import substitution policies whereby local
industries would more fully bene￿t from domestic demand. East Asian coun-
tries like Korea or Japan, rather than advocate import substitution policies,
would favor export promotion, which in turn would be achieved partly through
tari⁄s and non-tari⁄ barriers and partly through maintaining undervalued ex-
change rates. For at least two or three decades after WWII, these policies which
belong to what is commonly referred to as "industrial policy", remained fairly
non-controversial as both groups of countries were growing at fast rates.
However, the slow down in Latin America as of the 1970s, and then in
Japan as of the late 1990s, contributed to the growing scepticism about the role
of industrial policy in the process of development. Increasingly since the early
1980s, industrial policy has raised serious doubts among academics and policy
advisers in international ￿nancial institutions. In particular, it was criticized
for allowing governments to pick winners and losers in a discretionary fashion,
and consequently for increasing the scope for capture of governments by local
vested interests. Instead, policy makers and growth/development economists
would advocate general policies aimed at improving the "investment climate: the
liberalization of product and labor markets, a legal and enforcement framework
that protects (private) property rights, and macroeconomic stabilization. This
new set of growth recommendations came to be known as the "Washington
consensus", as it was primarily advocated by the IMF, the World Bank and the
US Treasury, all based in Washington D.C.
The Washington consensus advocates did have a case: for example recent
empirical work by Frankel and Romer (1999) and Wacziarg (2001) would point
to a positive e⁄ect of trade liberalization on growth. Thus Wacziarg (2001)
showed that increasing trade restrictions by one standard deviation would reduce
productivity growth by 0.264% annually. Similarly, Keller (2002,2004) showed
that 70% of international R&D spillovers are due to cross-country trade ￿ ows,
and more recently Aghion et al (2008) pointed to large growth-enhancing e⁄ects
1of the trade liberalization and delicensing reforms introduced in India in the
early 1990s, particularly in more advanced sectors or in Indian states with more
￿ exible labor market regulations.
The main goal of this paper is to see a case can still be made for policies
aimed at supporting or protecting some local sectors, or whether the propo-
nents a full and unconditional liberalization, have de￿nitely won the debate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the infant industry
argument as it is traditionally stated, and then discusses recent empirical work
that refutes this argument. Section 3 develops a ￿rst counterargument, based
on the discouragement e⁄ect of trade liberalization. Section 4 develops a second
potential counterargument, which like the initial infant industry argument, em-
phasizes the existence cross-sectoral learning spillovers, but proposes a di⁄erent
strategy to test for such spillovers. Section 5 concludes with comments on the
relationship between industrial policy and the conduct of macroeconomic policy
over the cycle.
2 The traditional infant industry argument
2.1 The argument in a nutshell
The infant industry argument, e.g formalized by Greenwald and Stiglitz (2006)1,
can be summarized as follows: consider a local economy which comprises a tra-
ditional (agricultural) sector and a nascent (industrial) sector. The industrial
sector￿ s new activities involve high costs initially, however production and the
resulting learning by doing reduces these costs over time. Moreover, suppose the
existence of knowledge externailities between these new industrial activities and
the traditional sector. Then two conclusions immediately obtain in this setting.
First, full trade liberalization will make it very costly for domestic industrial
sectors to invest in learning by doing: so involves producing but not selling in
the short run since domestic costs are initially higher than foreign costs. Second,
the social bene￿ts from learning by doing are not fully internalized by indus-
trial sectors, since they do not internalize the knowledge externalities they have
on the agricultural sector. It is the combination of these two considerations
which justi￿es domestic policies aimed at (temporarily) protecting nascent in-
dustries. Such policies may either take the form of targeted subsidies or import
restrictions, or they may involve non-targeted policies, for example maintaining
undervalued exchange rates which will bene￿t the local industry as a whole as
long as it does not import too much inputs from abroad themselves.
2.2 Criticisms
The main objections to the infant industry argument have been empirical. Thus
Krueger and Tuncer (1982) saw no systematic tendency for non-protected ￿rms
or industries in Turkey over the 1960s to display higher productivity growth than
1See also Young (1991).
2less protected industries; moreover, they saw no apparent tendency for a new
industrial activity to display higher rates of growth than the overall industry to
which it belongs.
However the most compelling case against the traditional infant industry
argument, was recently made by Nunn and Tre￿ er (2007), henceforth NT. Nunn
and Tre￿ er￿ s argument goes as follows: if we were to believe the above infant
industry argument, then we should see a positive correlation between growth
and the extent to which the domestic tari⁄ structure is skilled-biased, the idea
being that learning by doing on new activities with knowledge spillovers on the
rest of the economy, should require more skills than other activities. Thus NT
regress average per capita GDP growth, measured by the log of (yc1=yc0), where
yc1 (resp. coe¢ cientyc0) denotes per capita GDP at the end (resp. the beginning
of the period), on the extent to which the tari⁄ structure is skill-biased (which
in turn is measured by the correlation coe¢ cient between skill intensity and the
level of tari⁄s across sectors). A straight cross-country regression with region
and cohort ￿xed e⁄ects, shows a positive and signi￿cant correlation between
growth the skill-bias of the tari⁄ structure.
Thus, at ￿rst sight, NT￿ s regression results seem to con￿rm the infant indus-
try argument. However, NT push the analysis further by regressing, for each
sector in each country, per capita growth on both, the country-level measure of
skill bias of tari⁄s, and a new (industry-level) tari⁄-skill interaction term: this
latter term interacts the tari⁄for that particular industry with the ratio of skills
over unskilled labor in that same industry. The intriguing result is that the co-
e¢ cient for this industry-level tari⁄-skill interaction, is negative and signi￿cant!
In other words, the positive coe¢ cient on the aggregate measure of skill-biased
tari⁄ found in the previous regression, re￿ ects something else than the growth
e⁄ect of protecting more skill-biased industries, Actually NT argue that the ex-
planation for the positive coe¢ cient involves a third variable, namely the quality
of local institutions, which is positively correlated with growth and also with
the government￿ s propensity to emphasize skill intensive sectors. But it does
not seem to re￿ ect a direct causality between industrial policy and growth.
Does this render the Greenwald-Stiglitz story and/or more generally the case
for infant industry policies fully irrelevant? In the remaining part of the paper
we argue otherwise, yet taking the positive e⁄ects of liberalization into account.
3 The discouragement e⁄ect of trade liberaliza-
tion
In this section we analyze the e⁄ects of trade liberalization on innovation and
growth in the domestic economy. In particular, we discuss the possibility that
trade liberalization could inhibit growth in some economies, and whether this
might in turn justify some form of temporary protection.
33.1 Preliminary: the closed-economy model
We ￿rst analyze innovation and growth in a closed-economy, which we use as
benchmark case to analyze the e⁄ects of trade liberalization.
3.1.1 Production and national income
There is a single country in which a unique ￿nal good, which also serves as








itdi; 0 < ￿ < 1 (1)
where L is the domestic labor force, assumed to be constant, Ait is the quality
of intermediate good i at time t, and xit is the ￿ ow quantity of intermediate
good i being produced and used at time t.
In each intermediate sector there is a monopolist producer who uses the ￿nal
good as the sole input, with one unit of ￿nal good needed to produce each unit
of intermediate good. The monopolist￿ s cost of production is therefore equal
to the quantity produced xit: The price pit at which she can sell this quantity
of intermediate good to the competitive ￿nal sector is the marginal product of
intermediate good i in the ￿nal good production function (1)
The monopolist will choose the level of output that maximizes pro￿ts; namely
xit = AitL￿2=(1￿￿) (2)
resulting in the pro￿t level
￿it = ￿AitL (3)
where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
1+￿
1￿￿.
The equilibrium level of ￿nal output in the economy can be found by sub-
stituting the xit￿ s into (1), which yields
Yt = ’AtL (4)
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Productivity growth comes from innovations. In each sector, at each date there
is a unique entrepreneur with the possibility of innovating in that sector. She is
the incumbent monopolist, and an innovation would enable her to produce with
a productivity (quality) parameter Ait = ￿Ai;t￿1 that is superior to that of the
previous monopolist by the factor ￿ > 1. Otherwise her productivity parameter
stays the same: Ait = Ai;t￿1: In order to innovate with any given probability ￿
she must spend the amount
cit(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(￿) ￿ Ai;t￿1
of ￿nal good in research, where ￿ > 0 is a subsidy parameter that represents the
extent to which national policies encourage innovation, and ￿ is a cost function
satisfying
￿(0) = 0; and
￿
0 (￿) > 0; ￿
00 (￿) > 0 for all ￿ > 0
Thus the local entrepreneur￿ s expected pro￿t net of research cost is
Vit = E￿it ￿ cit(￿)
= ￿￿L￿Ai;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿LAi;t￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿)Ai;t￿1
She will choose the value of ￿ that maximizes these expected pro￿ts.
Each local entrepreneur will choose a frequency of innovations ￿￿ that max-
imizes Vit: The ￿rst-order condition for an interior maximum is @Vit=@￿ = 0,
which can be expressed as the research arbitrage equation:
￿
0 (￿) = ￿L(￿ ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ ￿): (5)
If the research environment is are favorable enough (i.e. if ￿ is large enough),
or the population large enough, so that:
￿
0 (0) > ￿L(￿ ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ ￿)
then the unique solution ￿ to the research arbitrage equation (5) is positive, so
in each sector the probability of an innovation is that solution (b ￿ = ￿), which
is an increasing function of the size of population L and of the policies favoring
innovation ￿. Otherwise there is no positive solution to the research arbitrage
equation so the local entrepreneur chooses never to innovate (b ￿ = 0).
Since each Ait grows at the rate ￿ ￿ 1 with probability b ￿; and at the rate 0
with probability 1 ￿ b ￿, therefore the expected growth rate of the economy is
g = b ￿(￿ ￿ 1)
So we see that countries with a larger population and more favorable innovation
conditions will be more likely to grow, and if they grow will grow faster, than
countries with a smaller population and less favorable innovation conditions.
53.2 The e⁄ects of openness on innovation and long-run
growth
Now, let us open trade in goods (both intermediate and ￿nal) between the
domestic country and the rest of the world, and we ￿rst take productivities in
all domestic and foreign sectors to be given. Productivity-enhancing innovations
are introduced in the next section.
To keep it simple, suppose that there are just two countries, called ￿home￿
and ￿foreign￿ , which di⁄er in terms of the size of population and the policies
favoring innovation. Suppose that the range of intermediate products in each
country is identical, that they produce exactly the same ￿nal product, and that
there are no transportation costs. Within each intermediate sector the world
market can then be monopolized by the producer with the lowest cost. We use
asterisks to denote foreign-country variables.
To begin with, each country does no trade, and hence behaves just like the
closed economy described in the previous section. Then at time t we allow them
to trade costlessly with each other. The immediate e⁄ect of this opening up is
to allow each country to take advantage of more e¢ cient productive e¢ ciency.










itdi; 0 < ￿ < 1 (6)
where b Ait is the higher of the two initial productivity parameters:
b Ait = maxfAit;A￿
itg














￿ di; 0 < ￿ < 1 (7)
The monopolist in sector i whose intermediate good has productivity b Ait,
can now sell to both countries, and thereby achieve the pro￿t level
￿it = ￿ b Ait (L + L￿) (8)




We now endogeneize the growth of productivities Ait and A￿
it. Consider the
innovation process in a given sector i. In the country where the monopoly
currently resides, the country is on the global technology frontier for sector i,
and the local entrepreneur will aim at making a frontier innovation that raises
the productivity parameter from b Ait to ￿ b Ait. If so, that country will retain
a global monopoly in intermediate product i. In the other country, the local
6entrepreneur will be trying to catch up with the frontier by implementing the
current frontier technology. If she succeeds and the frontier entrepreneur fails to
advance the frontier that period, then the lagging country will have caught up,
both countries will be on the frontier, and we can suppose that each entrepreneur
will monopolize the market for product i in her own country. But if the frontier
entrepreneur does advance the frontier then the entrepreneur in the lagging
country will still remain behind and will earn no pro￿t income.
Over time, the lead in each sector will tend to pass from country to country,
as long as the lagging sector is innovating. (Otherwise the lead will remain the
country that starts with the lead when trade is opened up.) However there will
be no immediate leapfrogging of one country by the other, because in order to
retake the lead a country must ￿rst catch up. So in between lead changes there
will be a period when the sector is level, or neck-and-neck. The growth rate
of productivity will be determined by the incentives to perform R&D in the
di⁄erent cases (when the country is the sole leader, when it is the laggard, and
when the sector is level.) So we need to study each case in turn.
3.2.2 Three cases
Three possibilities must be considered. Either a domestic sector leads over the
corresponding sector in the foreign country (case A); or the domestic sector is
at level (neck-and-neck) with its counterpart in the foreign country (case B); or
the domestic sector lags behind its foreign counterpart (case C). More precisely.
A Case A is the case in which the lead in sector i resides in the home country,
while the foreign country lags behind. In this case the expected pro￿t of
the entrepreneur in the home country, net of R&D costs, is
EUA = ￿A￿ (L + L￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿A)(L + (1 ￿ ￿￿
A)L￿)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿A)
while the expected pro￿t of the foreign entrepreneur is
EU￿
A = ￿￿
A (1 ￿ ￿A)￿L￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿(￿￿
A)
where everything is normalized by the pre-existing productivity level.
That is, with probability ￿A the home entrepreneur will innovate, thus
earning all the global pro￿ts in the market at productivity level ￿ times the
pre-existing level; if she fails to innovate then she will still earn all domes-
tic pro￿ts in the market, at the pre-existing pro￿t level, and if the foreign
entrepreneur fails to innovate (which occurs with probability 1 ￿ ￿￿
A) she
will also earn all the foreign pro￿ts in the market. In any event she must
incur the R&D cost (1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿A). Likewise the foreign entrepreneur will
earn all the pro￿ts in the foreign market if she innovates and her rival
doesn￿ t, which occurs with probability ￿￿
A (1 ￿ ￿A).
B Case B is the case in which the sector is level. In this case the expected
pro￿ts of the respective entrepreneurs net of R&D costs are
EUB = (￿B (L + (1 ￿ ￿￿
B)L￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ ￿￿
B)L)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿B) and
EU￿
B = (￿￿
B (L￿ + (1 ￿ ￿B)L)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿￿
B)(1 ￿ ￿B)L￿)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿(￿￿
B)
7That is, for example, the home entrepreneur innovates with probability
￿B; which earns her all the home pro￿ts for sure and all the foreign pro￿ts
if her rival fails to innovate, whereas if both fail to innovate then she retains
all the domestic pro￿ts.
C Case C is the case in which the foreign country starts with the lead. By anal-
ogy with case A the expected pro￿ts minus R&D costs are respectively:
EUC = ￿C (1 ￿ ￿￿
C)￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿C) and
EU￿
C = ￿￿
C￿ (L + L￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿￿
C)(L￿ + (1 ￿ ￿C)L)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿(￿￿
C)
3.2.3 Equilibrium innovation and growth
The research arbitrage equations that determine the innovation rates in equi-
librium, are simply obtained by taking the ￿rst order conditions for each of
the above expected pro￿t minus R&D cost expression. Innovation rates in the
domestic country thus satisfy:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
0 (￿A)=￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)(L + L￿) + ￿￿
AL￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
0 (￿B)=￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)L + ￿￿
BL + (1 ￿ ￿￿
B)￿L￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
0 (￿C)=￿ = (1 ￿ ￿￿
C)L
and symmetrically for innovation in the foreign country.3
In steady state, there will be a constant fraction of sectors in each state,
qA;qB and qC; with qA + qB + qC = 1; while aggregate productivity will be
b At = qA b AAt + qB b ABt + qC b ACt
where for example b AAt is the average productivity level in sectors where the
lead resides in the home country. It follows that the growth rate of aggregate
productivity (and hence of each country￿ s national income) in steady state will
be
g = ￿AgA + ￿BgB + ￿CgC (9)
where for each state S = A;B;C, ￿S = qS b ASt= b At is the share of aggregate
productivity accounted for by sectors in state S in the steady state, and gS is
the expected growth rate of the leading technology b Ait in each sector currently
in state S.
Since the ￿￿ s add up to one, this implies that the steady-state growth rate
of the open economy is a weighted average of the productivity growth rates gS:
3That is:
(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿0 (￿￿
A)=￿ = (1 ￿ ￿A)L￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿0 (￿￿
B)=￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)L￿ + ￿BL￿ + (1 ￿ ￿B)￿L
(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿0 (￿￿
C)=￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)(L + L￿) + ￿CL
8These are respectively
gA = (￿ ￿ 1)￿A
gB = (￿ ￿ 1)(￿B + ￿￿
B ￿ ￿B￿￿
B)
gC = (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
C
Our conclusions in the remaining part of the section will be derived from
comparing the home country research arbitrage equations under openness with
the closed economy research arbitrage equation (5), which we reproduce here
for convenience:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
0 (￿)=￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)L: (10)
3.2.4 Scale and escape entry
Comparing this closed economy research arbitrage equation with the one gov-
erning ￿A:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
0 (￿A)=￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)(L + L￿) + ￿￿
AL￿ (11)
we see that when the home country has the technology lead (case A) it will
innovate at a faster rate than when it was a closed economy, because the right-
hand side of the leader￿ s research arbitrage equation (11) is larger than the
right-hand side of the closed economy counterpart (10). This is because of two
e⁄ects, scale and escape entry.
The scale e⁄ect arises because the successful innovator gets enhanced pro￿ts
from both markets, not just the domestic market, thus giving her a stronger
incentive to innovate. This is why (11) has the sum of size variables L + L￿
where (10) has just the domestic size variable L.
The escape entry e⁄ect arises because the unsuccessful innovator in the open
economy is at risk of losing the foreign market to her foreign rival, a risk that
she can avoid by innovating. By contrast the unsuccessful innovator in the
closed economy loses nothing to a foreign rival and thus does not have this
extra incentive to innovate. Formally, this e⁄ect accounts for the extra term
￿￿
AL￿ that appears on the right hand side of (11) but not of (10).
Comparing the closed economy research arbitrage equation (10) to the one
governing the home country￿ s innovation rate in a level sector:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
0 (￿B)=￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)L + ￿￿
BL + (1 ￿ ￿￿
B)￿L￿
we see the same two e⁄ects at work. The term ￿￿
BL is the escape entry e⁄ect; by
innovating the home entrepreneur can avoid the risk of losing the local market.
The term (1 ￿ ￿￿
B)￿L￿ is the scale e⁄ect; by innovating the home entrepreneur
can capture (with some probability) the foreign market as well as the domestic
market.
It follows that both ￿A and ￿B will be larger than the closed economy
innovation rate ￿: The same will be true for the foreign innovation rates ￿￿
C and
￿￿
B, which will both be larger than the foreign countries innovation rate when
it was closed, ￿￿.
93.2.5 The discouragement e⁄ect of foreign entry
We saw in Chapter 12 above that a country behind the world technology frontier
may be discouraged from innovating by the threat of entry because even if it
innovates it might lose out to a superior entrant. This is re￿ ected in the research
arbitrage equation governing the home country￿ s innovation rate in case C, the
case where it is the technological laggard:
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
0 (￿C)=￿ = (1 ￿ ￿￿
C)L
If the foreign country￿ s innovation rate is large enough when it has the lead,
then the right-hand side of this research arbitrage equation will be strictly less
than that of the closed economy equation (10), so we will have ￿C < ￿. This
does not have a direct e⁄ect on the growth rate (9) because gC depends only on
the leader￿ s innovation rate ￿￿
C. That is, in this state the home country is just
catching up, not advancing the global technology frontier. However, as we shall
see, a fall in ￿C will nevertheless have an indirect e⁄ect on growth by a⁄ect-
ing the steady state weights ￿S in (9), which are the fractions of productivity
accounted for by the sectors in each state.
3.2.6 How trade can reduce growth in one country
The fact that trade raises growth in both countries when either the countries
are symmetrical or one country fails to innovate when behind suggests that
trade will usually raise growth in both countries. But there can be exceptions.
These exceptions of course must involve countries that are asymmetrical. For
example, consider the case of a small country (home) whose policies used to
be very unfavorable to innovation but which has recently undertaken a reform
to make the country more innovative. Suppose these policies have been so
successful that just before opening up to trade, the home country has a faster
growth rate than the foreign country:
￿ > ￿￿
but the reforms have been so recent that the home country is still behind the
foreign country in all sectors. Then initially after the opening up to trade all
monopolies will reside in the foreign country; that is, all sectors will be in case C
above. Now suppose furthermore that the discouragement e⁄ect is large enough
that the home country does not innovate when behind (￿C = 0). Then as we
have seen all monopolies will remain forever in the foreign country.
This is the case in which, as we saw above, the home country￿ s level of na-
tional income might actually fall when trade is opened up, because the increased
e¢ ciency of the selection e⁄ect might be outweighed by the loss of pro￿ts from
the home-country monopolists that are forced out of business by foreign com-
petition. What we can now see is that whether or not national income falls at
￿rst, the home country￿ s growth rate from then on may be lower than if it had
never opened up to trade.
10More speci￿cally, if it had not opened up for trade then its growth rate would
have remained equal to
g = (￿ ￿ 1)￿
whereas under open trade its growth rate will be that of each sector in case C,
namely
g0 = (￿ ￿ 1)￿￿
C
So the home country growth rate will be reduced by trade if and only if ￿￿
C < ￿:
Now we know from our analysis above that ￿￿
C must exceed the innovation rate
that the foreign country would have experienced under autarky:
￿￿
C > ￿￿
but this does not guarantee that it exceeds the innovation rate that the home
country would have experienced under autarky. Indeed if ￿￿
C is close enough to
￿￿ then it will be strictly less than ￿ and the home country￿ s growth rate will
indeed be reduced by trade.
This is where our assumption that the home country is small comes into
play. For if it is very small relative to the foreign country then the scale e⁄ect
of trade on the foreign innovation rate ￿￿
C will be small. Since we are assuming
that the home country never innovates when behind, therefore there is no escape
entry e⁄ect on ￿￿
C, so if the home country is small enough then ￿￿
C will indeed
be close enough to ￿￿ that it falls below ￿ and the home country￿ s growth rate
is diminished by trade.
So we have a presumption that if there are instances where trade is bad for
growth, they are probably in small countries that start o⁄ far behind the global
technology frontier. We also have an example of how economic reform needs
to be sequenced properly in order to have its desired e⁄ect. That is, generally
speaking a country￿ s growth prospects are enhanced by liberalizing trade and
by removing barriers to innovation. But if these reforms are undertaken simul-
taneously then their full bene￿ts might not be realized. Instead it might be
better to remove the barriers to innovation ￿rst and then to wait until several
domestic industries have become world leaders before removing the barriers to
international trade.
4 A case for targeted intervention: industrial
niches
The notion that the existing pattern of specialization may limit the evolution of
comparative advantage over time has not received much attention in the growth
literature so far. For example in Romer (1990)￿ s product variety model, the
current set of inputs display the same degree of imperfect substitutability with
respect to any new input that might be introduced, and therefore does not
make one new input more likely than any other: this property stems directly
from the fully symmetric nature of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of product di⁄er-
entiation upon which the Romer model is built. However an important insight
11that emerges from the work of Alwyn Young (1991), Lucas (1993), and more
recently Haumann and Klinger (2007), is that successful growth stories are one
involving gradual processes whereby neighboring sectors experiment with new
technologies one after the other because experimentation involves learning by
doing externalities across sectors.
To illustrate the case for targeted intervention based on the existence of
cross-sectoral externalities in the simplest possible way, consider the following
toy model. Individuals each live for one period. There are four potential sectors
in the economy, which we number from 1 to 4, but only one sector, namely
sector 1, is active at date zero. Thus, the economy at date 0 can be represented
by the 4-tuple
￿0 = (1;0;0;0);
where the number 1 (resp. 0) in column i refers to the corresponding sector
i being currently active (resp. inactive). At date t; a sector that is active
produces at the frontier productivity level At = (1 + g)t: Once activated a
sector automatically remains active forever. Aggregate output at date t is
Yt = At = NtAt;
where Nt is the number of active sectors at date t:
R&D investments activate new sectors, but there is a cost of learning about
faraway sectors. Speci￿cally, there is a ￿xed R&D cost ￿(1 + g)t of activating
a sector in period t, but this is only possible if (a) the sector is adjacent to an
already active sector or (b) the R&D cost ￿(1+g)t￿1 was also incurred in that
sector last period.
Consider ￿rst the economy under laissez-faire. Being populated by one-
period lived individuals, the economy will never invest in a sector that is not
adjacent to a sector already active. At best, a local entrepreneur will ￿nd it
optimal to activate a sector adjacent to an already active sector. This will be
the case whenever
￿ < ￿;
where ￿ is the fraction of output that can be appropriated by a private innovator.
Note however that if
￿ < ￿;
then private ￿rms will not explore new sectors, even neighboring ones, even
though it might be socially optimal to do so.
Coming back to the case where ￿ < ￿;in this case the laissez-faire sequence
of active sectors will be:
￿1 = (1;1;0;0)
￿2 = (1;1;1;0)
￿t = (1;1;1;1); t ￿ 3
Now consider a social planner. The social planner will invest in sector 2 in
period 1, whenever the cost ￿(1 + g) of doing so is less than the net present













For g su¢ ciently close to r or for ￿ su¢ ciently small, this inequality is auto-
matically satis￿ed, in which case it will also be optimal to invest in sector 3
in period 2 because at that date sector 3 will be adjacent to an already active
sector (namely sector 2).
But in addition, whenever ￿ is su¢ ciently small, it will be optimal to invest
in sector 4 in period 1, because that will allow sector 4 to be activated in period
2 whereas otherwise it can only be activated in period 3. Investing in period 1
instead of period 2 in sector 4 will yield an additional
A2=(1 + r)





the optimal sequence of active sectors will be:
￿1 = (1;1;0;0)
￿2 = (1;1;1;1)
￿t = (1;1;1;1); t ￿ 3
The laissez-faire equilibrium is suboptimal because people do not invest far
enough away from already active sectors. In this example output will be lower
than optimal in period 2 (3A2 versus 4A2) because individuals were not far
sighted enough to invest in sector 4, which was too far away from already active
sectors, in period 1.
Thus this model suggests a role for targeted industrial policy: namely, to
overcome the potential underinvestment in new sectors. In particular, if targeted
subsidies were to be implemented by a government, we conjecture that such
subsidies should be more growth-enhancing: (i) if they target sectors that are
currently inactive but close "input-wise" to already active sectors, and (ii) if the
country experiences low levels of ￿nancial development or low labor mobility or
low average levels of education. Part (i) implies that the targeted sectors are
more likely to bene￿t from learning-by-doing externalities from already active
sectors. Part (ii) makes it less likely that market forces will spontaneously take
advantage of these externalities.
The idea that the product space is heterogeneous, with an uneven density of
active product lines, and that the current density distribution of active sectors
13impacts on the evolution of comparative advantage, is taken to the data by
Hausmann and Klinger (2006), henceforth HK. HK measure the relatedness
between two product lines by the probability ’i;j that on average countries
exports enough of the two goods simultaneously. 4 Then, HK de￿ne the density
around good i in country c as the average relatedness of that product with other









where xc;k;t is the volume of export of product k by country c at time t:
A main ￿nding in HK is that the probability of a country exporting product
i in year t+1; is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with the country￿ s density
around product i in year t: This in turn provides empirical support to the idea
that countries move towards new product lines that are adjacent to existing
lines, even though this may be suboptimal as discussed above.
Two arguments at least can be opposed to targeted interventions of the kind
suggested in this section: (a) such policies may serve as a pretext for government
favors, particularly if input-output information can be manipulated by politi-
cians or bureaucrats; (b) what guarantees that temporary support to industries
will be terminated, especially if the investment turns out to be ine¢ cient? One
possible answer to these two objections, would be to involve third parties (for
example private partners) which would access input-output information and
would also act as co￿nanciers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to push the discussion on industrial policy a little
further. In particular we have identi￿ed (extreme) situations where temporary
protection might be called for, and we have also try to resurrect the case for
targeted interventions.
An additional case for intervention can be made in relation to the busi-
ness cycle. More speci￿cally, recent work by Aghion, Hemous and Kharroubi
(2009) uses a sample of 45 industries across 17 OECD countries over the period
1980-2005, to show that growth in industrial sectors that are more dependent
upon external ￿nance (using Rajan and Zingales (1998)￿ s methodology), bene-
￿ts more from more countercyclical ￿scal policies, i.e from policies that involve
larger de￿cits in recessions (compensated by bigger surpluses during booms).
Moreover, it is more the expenditure side than the revenue side of governments￿
4More speci￿cally, relatedness between products i and j is measured by:
’i;j = minfP(xi=xj);P(xj=xi)g;
where P(xi=xj) is the probability that a country export (enough of) good i conditional upon
exporting (enough of) good j:
14budgets whose countercyclicality matters more for growth in such sectors. A
natural issue then, is whether government support to such sectors during reces-
sions does or does not amount to some other form of industrial policy.
Whether these arguments are in some cases stronger than the powerful po-
litical economy counterargument(s), needs to be assessed depending upon char-
acteristics of the country or the sector, and also with regard to the economy￿ s
location in the business cycle. In any case, the general recommendation made
by the Spence report with regard to industrial policy strikes us as stemming
from common sense: namely, experiment, and then make sure you can stop the
intervention if it turns out not be e¢ cient.
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